

A N  
A T T E M P T  
TO PROVE  
THE MATERIALITY OF THE SOUL,  
BY  
REASON AND SCRIPTURE.

WITH AN  
APPENDIX,  
SHEWING THE  
INFLUENCE OF THIS OPINION  
UPON THE  
FAITH AND PRACTICE  
OF  
CHRISTIANS.

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BY  
The Rev. EDWARD HOLMES, A.M.  
MASTER OF SCORTON SCHOOL.

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# DEDICATION.

TO THE

*Rev. JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, LL.D. F.R.S.*

SIR,

I Took the liberty of informing you, by a private communication, that before I composed the following little piece, I had never read any thing professedly written upon the same subject; and that when I had finished it, my intention was to read your Disquisitions upon Matter and Spirit, and avail myself of any additional arguments they might suggest, to be inserted in notes. In perusing this truly ingenious work, I found numerous arguments, which, if I had transcribed into mine as I at first intended, would undoubtedly have been

its greatest merit. But as I thought there was a general coincidence in our proofs, such insertions from a publication universally known, I was apprehensive, might be considered as an imposition upon the public, and therefore reluctantly determined to publish my imperfect piece as it was.

I shall think myself peculiarly happy if it meet with your approbation, as I am persuaded it cannot be submitted to the examination of a more competent judge.

I am, with sincerest thanks for your many and important services in the cause of true Christianity,

S I R,

Your humble Servant,

*EDW. HOLMES.*

SCORTON,  
April 5, 1789.

A N

A T T E M P T

To prove the MATERIALITY of the Soul,

B Y R E A S O N.

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S E C T. I.

MANY of the heathen philosophical enquirers into the nature of the human soul, were desirous to prove that it was immaterial, and consequently, as they concluded, immortal. The issue of this enquiry affords a full though melancholy proof, that man's unassisted reason is incapable of investigating this important matter. In perusing their ingenious arguments upon this topic, one cannot forbear lamenting sincerely, that such good and learned men had no clearer light to direct them in the investigation of a doctrine they seem so desirous of establishing. But the time of that dispensation, which alone could bring life and immortality to *full* light, was not yet arrived; and it pleased the great Disposer of all things to suffer a great part of mankind to remain in ignorance of this truth, till the fulness of time, when he sent forth his Son to reveal it to them. For the utmost ingenuity of *human reason* could never have proved that the soul was *imma-*

rial, much less that it was *of itself immortal*. The first and most obvious conclusion of reason would be, that the soul is material; as it receives impressions from matter; and we have no conception how a material acts upon an immaterial substance. But reason would not conclude that the soul is absolutely material, because it cannot conceive how otherwise it should be influenced by matter; because it is too conscious of its limited powers to infer that any thing *is impossible*, because it cannot comprehend the *manner* of its existence. From its examination of the properties of unorganized matter, it discovers no indications of a principle of self-motion in it, but just the contrary; but in almost all living animals such a principle appears; from whence it makes this inference, That matter, *as matter*, has not a principle of self-motion. This principle of self-motion, voluntary action, or rather acting in consequence of volition, reason supposes to proceed from the soul or mind, and therefore concludes that every animal in which it is found has a thinking faculty or soul similar to that of man. Hence many of the heathens believed not only that brutes had souls, but that these souls survived the dissolution of their bodies.

2. The pride of man indeed would persuade him that he is the *only rational creature* in the universe, and that all other animals are actuated by an invariable, mechanical principle, which he calls *instinct*. But this reasoning, dictated by human vanity, is both false and arrogant. We know, by daily experience, that many animals admit of a great and surprising *improvement* in their reasoning faculty, by proper instructions ; and many, without any particular instruction, exhibit such indications of a thinking faculty, as cannot be ascribed to any invariable mechanical principle whatever ; for

— they also know,  
And reason not contemptibly. PAR. LOST. B. 8.

To adduce instances in a case so obvious, would be an insult to common sense. For is it not self-evident that many animals besides man have a faculty of reason, and consequently what we call a soul or mind, and that if this soul be immaterial in man, it must be so likewise in brutes ? I cannot conceive how this inference can be evaded, except it can be proved that immaterial substances are different in creatures differently organized ; a proposition which involves an apparent

contradiction, and I presume is incapable of proof. Supposing then that the thinking faculty in all creatures is material, this supposition will be more consonant both to reason and experience than the contrary. But it will be asked, does reason or experience prove that matter thinks? I answer, neither of these can prove that matter *cannot be made to think*; for this would be to deny the omnipotence of the Creator of all things. What the ingenious Mr Locke has advanced, in his controversy with the Bishop of Worcester upon this subject, supersedes any necessity of repeating proofs.

3. Indeed, some writers of reputation, and among the rest the learned and ingenious author of "The Religion of Nature delineated," have gone so far as to assert, that the existence of a *material thinking substance is impossible*. This assertion *expressly* denies the omnipotence of the Creator, and is founded, I suppose, upon wrong ideas affixed to the word *essence*. The essence of substances must be determined by their *properties*, otherwise the essence of all things, material and immaterial, will be the same. The primary or original essence of a horse and a tree may be

allowed to be the same, as to the *mere matter* of which they are constituted; but are their *properties* the same? Has a tree sensation, perception, and reflection, and in consequence of this last property a locomotive power, or a power of self-motion? If it have not, I should conclude that it differs *essentially* from a horse, or any other organized self-moving creature. From the ideas transferred by analogy from organized and animated bodies, we say that a tree inspires and respires, that it has pores, fibres, absorbent and lacteal vessels, by means of which it imbibes its nourishment from the earth and air; but its want of sensation, perception, reflection, and voluntary motion, must for ever exclude its claim to the essence of a horse. To assert that all matter, however modified, is *essentially the same*, is to affirm that there is no characteristic difference between animate and inanimate substances, between the *coals* which prepare our meat for our tables, and the *living* ox or sheep whose flesh is thus prepared. It is certainly high time to discard such unphilosophical and absurd assertions in literary and scientific researches, and recur to the

plain dictates of common sense, which will never allow that a horse and a tree are the same, or have a *common essence*.

4. It does not appear to me that there is any reason for making a distinction between the real and nominal essence of things, as Mr Locke has done; for the essence of things depends not upon our ideas of them, but their real, inherent properties. If we shew a person ignorant of geometry a right-lined triangle and a circle, and tell him that the first has its three angles equal to two right ones, and that the second has its periphery in all parts equally distant from a point called its centre, we are describing to him the *essential properties* of these two figures; but he will have no idea of any *nominal essence* in them, because we give the *name* of a triangle to the one, and of a circle to the other. For supposing him to know that our ideas are no copies or representations of external objects, he will conclude that the circle might have been *named* a triangle, and the triangle a circle, without altering our ideas of their real properties. But I hope enough has been said upon the misapplication of the word *essence*, to prove that a substance capable of sensation, perception, and

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reflection, may be *really matter*, though it differ from *mere matter*\* in these properties.

\* [The following observations, and others marked §, †, ‡, were communicated by a learned and worthy friend, who obligingly perused this little piece in manuscript, and consented to the publication of his ingenious remarks. As I have no object in this publication but the advancement of a truth, in my estimation of considerable importance to the interest of revelation, I therefore requested my friend's permission to publish his objections, and leave the merits of our respective opinions to the decision of the reader: I shall only premise, that by *mere matter* I mean *unorganized, inanimate matter*.]

" That a substance should be *real matter*, and yet differ from *mere matter* in any property whatever, is to me inconceivable. That substance which is not *mere matter* must consist of matter and something else, and that something else cannot be matter. To say that it is a particular organization, or the addition of particular properties, will not remove the difficulty: For then it might be said that a stone or a piece of iron are matter, with the properties of gravity superadded, and of a particular organization. That the property of volition, thought, or beginning motion can be added to matter, as matter, is contradictory to all the ideas I am able to form of matter. These are actions, which I think must originate in something superior, and entirely exempt from mechanical laws, to which matter must ever be subject. That an immaterial cannot act upon a material substance, for want of some common connecting property, is a *gratis dictum*, a mere argument to our ignorance, which makes the real essence of matter and spirit entirely a secret to us. To assert it is to contradict the first principle of metaphysical science, than which none has been more certainly demonstrated. I suppose it will not be denied that the first Almighty Cause is a pure, immaterial being; and yet the whole creation cries aloud through its whole extent, through the infinite variety of the divine operations, that this greatest, purest Spirit acts upon matter. Suppose this great Spirit to cease to exist, I am of opinion that universal matter would be annihilated along with him.

" If it be said the souls or minds of brutes also must, according to this mode of reasoning, be equally immaterial, I would grant the proposition; but this, it may be farther alleged, will entitle them also to a resurrection from the dead. This would be concluding without evidence. Because God gave to men and beasts alike an immaterial mind, it does not follow that either of them are naturally unperishable. An immaterial substance may perish,

5. The external senses are allowed by all to be material, and to be the organs which convey their peculiar sensations to the percipient faculty, or the soul. Now if the soul were immaterial, we cannot conceive what occasion it could have for material organs to convey to it any information. We acknowledge the existence of but one purely immaterial, self-existent Being, and he certainly has no organs of sensation;—but man has; therefore man, or his thinking faculty (which I consider at

when God withdraws from it his support, as well as a material one: The existence of both depends equally on his will. With regard to mankind, God made them moral and accountable agents, and has revealed his purpose of bringing them to an account in a future life. He neither made brutes moral agents, nor has declined whether they shall or shall not rise again. For my own part, I see no absurdity in supposing that their gracious Creator may provide for even their happiness in a future life, and that they may become serviceable to the happiness of men in the renovated state of both. But of this I believe neither the one nor the other, because I have no principle to go upon. It depends entirely on the unrevealed will of God."

§ " An immaterial soul can have no occasion for material organs. I suspect that this also will be called *argumentum ad ignorantiam*.—Nothing is easier to suppose than that there may be an infinite variety of degrees of perfection, even in immaterial created substance; and that a being so composed, as man is, of matter and spirit, was peculiarly fitted for the present state of probation, the greatest part of which arises from bodily appetitions and affections, which the mind is to controul and mortify, ensuring a painful victory by settled habits of moral rectitude. This gains him the favour of God, and makes him rewardable in a future world.—What, if God was willing to shew forth the greatness of his power and wisdom, by enabling a spirit of very inferior faculties, and furnished with organs gross and contemptible to higher orders, to exalt itself to great happiness and glory by its own victorious and strenuous exertions?—What a lesson to superior spirits!"

present as meaning the same thing) is not an immaterial being or substance.

6. Supposing the soul of man to be immaterial, it must be as perfect † in its perceptions and all its other operations in an infant, as in the most enlightened adult. Can age, or experience, or the growth of the body, make an immaterial soul more percipient, more discerning, more intelligent, or more rational? In my weak understanding, the idea of immateriality excludes any such *improvement*. We know by experience that the external senses, while they remain perfect, become more acute and discriminative by long application to their respective objects; and why should we not then conclude, that the improvement of the mind is the consequence of this increased and more accurate information conveyed to it by the senses? But it may be said, and cer-

† “I conceive that a newly created spiritual substance would be a perfect *tabula rasa*, without a single idea till it was supplied by its own experience and reflection; nor can I understand how matter, *mere* matter, unconnected with a really active substance, could begin to perceive or reflect at all. I conceive the highest and most perfect spirits which God first created to have made almost infinite improvements in wisdom and understanding, in the long duration of their existence, and to be still making daily additions. This I take to be the very case with the human mind, when it exerts itself with diligence, and has leisure and means of improvement. The external senses certainly grow more dull and inefficient by time, and we often find the most sublime mental attainments in those who have long lost the organs both of sight and hearing.”

tainly with great plausibility, that man's superiority to other creatures, in his power of reflection, and the infinitely superior energetic power of the social passions, which stimulate him to exert his mental abilities, to gain the love, esteem, affection, or applause of his fellow-creatures, is sufficient to account for this, without having recourse to any such improvement, made by means of the external senses, which is undoubtedly but partial, and inadequate to account for the many great and diversified improvements which are exhibited in cultivated minds, passionately addicted to the advancement of particular arts and sciences. With respect to the more accurate information conveyed to the mind by the external senses, we ought perhaps to account for it partly in the manner mentioned above, but more particularly as these senses are directed and assisted in examining their respective objects, by improved knowledge, obtained by reflection upon their properties, or the information communicated by others. And thus the external and internal senses aid, assist, and occasionally correct and rectify each other's information; and by this mutual co-operation, the mind is gratified by greater and

more satisfactory acquisitions of knowledge, or discoveries of truth, in its researches into the laws and properties of external objects. But if there be any truth in these observations, we may, without adopting Aristotle's ambiguous opinion upon this subject, consider the mind, or, perhaps more properly speaking, the *brain*, as a *sixth* internal general sense or sensorium, capable of perceiving the impressions made upon it by the external senses, and of combining these impressions or ideas into propositions, or, in other words, reasoning upon them, by the exertion of that faculty which we denominate *reflection*. Taking it for granted that the mind is material, I do not pretend to ascertain *how* it performs these operations; and upon the supposition of its immateriality, I am still more incapable of accounting for them. Upon both suppositions, we must be obliged to stop at that line which infinite power has been pleased to draw between our weak, imperfect understanding, and his ways, which are past finding out. But the Author of our being gave us reason to be our guide in *sentiment* as well as in *action*, and as far as its information allows us to pro-

ceed in this enquiry, the conclusion is in favour of the *materiality* of the soul.

7. For granting that the soul is immaterial, we must necessarily conclude that such a substance is in itself incapable† of death, or of

† “ I do not see the necessity of granting, that a created immaterial substance is incapable of (I will not say death, but) annihilation; or supposing it not utterly divested of existence, of becoming *inactive* or *inanimate*. It can possess no property which it owes not to the Creator’s will, nor, in my opinion, exist at all if he withdraw from it his support. It must therefore cease to exist if he support it no longer; and if it please him that it subsist in an inactive or inanimate state, I see no absurdity in supposing it to be continued in that state of inanimation and inactivity, especially if it be the design of God at some time, for the most wise purposes, to restore its suspended powers. This I take to be the case with respect to the human soul or mind, in the state of death. The fallacy of the old philosophers lay in this, that they excluded the will of God, and considered not the purpose for which he created the human soul; they took it for granted that it was an absolutely independent substance, and then their argument was conclusive for its perpetual existence, but not for its existence in a percipient active state. For I think it possible to conceive a spiritual substance to have been originally endowed with powers of such a nature, that a connection with material organs was necessary for their exertion.

“ I have already said enough to let you see what objections I conceive may be made to your reasoning, and therefore I will make no more remarks, except I should meet with any thing in your appendix that may strike me as objectionable. I am far from being certain that I see this matter in its true light. It is now many years since metaphysical subjects engaged my attention, and therefore I consider myself as exceedingly liable to mistake, and consequently set not any great value on what I now send you. That the whole powers of man are utterly extinguished by death, (more properly, perhaps, suspended) I have not the smallest doubt. The scriptures are to me otherwise unintelligible, and a resurrection unnecessary. I consider the present state of man as a kind of caterpillar-state. It will be succeeded by a state of torpidity, which will last till certain circumstances in external nature awake the slumbering, torpid insect, and call him forth in renovated vigour to the exercise of improved powers, and to habits of a more animated existence, which shall have no end. I should chuse to call death a state of sleep, rather than of extinction. To the practical Christian there is no difference.”

becoming, like the body, inactive and inanimate. Now if this be true, it must exist somewhere after the death of the body, separate and independent of it,—a *mode* of existence which we can form no conception of, no more than we can form of the *place* of its existence. Divest the soul of the external senses, and it immediately vanishes from our comprehension, the whole human frame becomes fixed and motionless as a clock when the pendulum ceases to vibrate. To say that the soul exerts its faculties *best* when it is *least* encumbered by the body, is the chimerical assertion of the ancient philosophers, who ignorantly supposed the body to be the seat of all the passions and affections. For let us imagine a person born without any of the external senses, and consequently without passions, according to this doctrine such a person would be far superior to any other in his reasoning faculty; his knowledge would be intuitive, perfect, and universal. But the supposition is so shockingly absurd, if not profane, that it deserves not a moment's serious attention. Had the ancient sages just mentioned proved, as they easily might have done,

that the mind alone is the seat of all the passions ; and affirmed, as their own experience would have directed, that irregular passions disturbed and embarrassed it in its investigation of truth, or true philosophy ; we should readily have allowed that such reasoning was metaphysically just. But it was this wrong conception of the passions which led some of them to maintain, that it was the duty of man, and the great business of philosophy, to extirpate them ; without perceiving what would have been the consequence of this doctrine, if it had been possible to realize it in fact. An animated *thinking creature without passions* is not a *man*, nor probably can such a being be found in the whole animal creation. But we have mentioned the passions as belonging to the mind, to shew how improbable it is that an immaterial substance should admit of any such affections, and more particularly that any such substance should be liable to be agitated by violent, irregular passions. Let us recollect the appearance of a person actuated by extreme anger, his fiery sparkling eyes, the distortion of his features, the quivering of his lips, and the agitation of his whole frame, and then enquire how an immaterial

substance can be supposed to cause such alterations in another, whose properties are directly contrary to its own. In a similar manner the rest of the passions, when violent, have their peculiar correspondent effects very significantly expressed in the various appearances of the body. We can easily conceive how one material substance may cause a greater or less degree of alteration in another, from the properties of matter, which are clearly and experimentally ascertained; but we have no idea of degrees in the effects which immaterial substances produce in material. But it may be said that this manner of arguing presupposes the materiality of the soul, but is by no means a proof of it. To this it may be answered, that this argument is not alleged as a proof either of the materiality or immateriality of the soul, —a point which the author does not presume that he can prove absolutely—but as a probable argument to shew that we have no idea of degrees of efficiency in immaterial substances. At the same time it must be allowed, as was observed before, that our ignorance of the existence of any thing is no proof of its non-existence, though it certainly is a sufficient cause for reason to suspend its assent in this

case, if it be not decided either way by divine revelation.

8. Man, as the Psalmist observes, is wonderfully made; yet it might be supposed, from a slight consideration of the matter, that he would be capable of knowing the operations of *his own mind*, and its process in the acquisition of knowledge, as his experience and reflection seem sufficient for this. But that important precept, *Know thyself*, is very difficultly applied in our moral examinations, in our metaphysical examinations much more so. To those who have carefully and habitually made this examination, no reason need be assigned for this difficulty; they know that it is perhaps absolutely impossible to divest the mind of those habits, prejudices, associations, and errors, which it contracted before it was capable of any accurate reflection upon itself. I mention this as an apology for my *own sentiments upon the present occasion*, and sincerely wish it may be extended to those who entertain *different sentiments*. If this persuasion had its proper influence upon disputants, all harsh and uncivil language, all severity and acrimony of censure, would be for ever excluded from all controversial writings. The

candid reader, I am persuaded, will readily acquit me of using any magisterial or dictatorial language, in the discussion of this difficult and controverted question, language indeed which would ill become one who professes to write rather for information himself, than to convey it to others. I defend no party, consult no interest, but that of truth; for however numerous or respectable the profelytes to my opinion may be, I am persuaded I shall derive little or no advantage from this, either in respect of emolument or honour. A writer thus circumstanced labours under many disadvantages; for though the public should in general allow the propriety of his motives for writing, yet it may think itself authorized in censuring his writing *at all* upon such a subject. Should this really be the case, I have still the consolation to think, that the opinion of the soul's materiality is rather theoretical than practical, as I hope will appear satisfactorily proved in the Appendix to the second section.—As then I think the question is really such, I shall make no apology for troubling the reader with some additional arguments in support of it.

9. In the first place I must observe, that I fully acquiesce in Dr Reid's arguments for re-

jecting the opinion of the celebrated Mr Locke, who contends that all our ideas arise from *sensation* and *reflection*. The first mentioned author has clearly proved, that the sources of our ideas are *sensation* and *perception*, a matter of experience so obvious, that it is surprizing it should escape the acute penetration of a Locke. The reader will have observed that some preceding arguments on the operations of the mind suppose this distinction, and I beg his pardon for not having made it in its proper place. Though I agree with Dr Reid as to the sources of our ideas, yet I think *perception* may with propriety be considered as the source of *simple*, and *reflection* as the source of *complex ideas*, or knowledge. I cannot indeed find sufficient reason to conclude with Dr Reid, that the mind in perception is both *active* and *passive*. It does not appear to me true that every *sensation* necessarily implies *perception*; though I grant, on the contrary, that there can be no perception without sensation. Thus, to take an instance from Dr Reid, when we are deeply engaged in any interesting conversation, a clock—I think it should have been added, that we have been long accustomed to bear—may strike near us, and we shall not hear it, or at least not remember its

striking. In this case the sound will undoubtedly be propagated to the ear by the medium of the air, and consequently a sensation produced; why not then a consequent perception? Because the mind, attentive to other more interesting impressions or ideas, does not advert to that particularly, and therefore, though there be a real sensation, there is no consequent perception. This is confirmed by many facts related of learned and studious men, who, when their minds were engaged in deep and intricate study, were so far absorbed in their interesting speculations, as to be absolutely inattentive to very powerful sensations. Of the great Sir Isaac Newton it is recorded, that when he was engaged in his most elaborate researches into the laws of nature, he was inattentive to the sensation of hunger; and I am persuaded that every person's own experience will furnish him with similar instances. These observations do not prove that the mind is active in its perceptions, but only that the connection between sensation and perception is not *necessary*. It is undoubtedly true, for experience proves it, that we cannot excite any sensation in the mind by an act of volition, and consequently the mind

in its primary affection, that is, perception, is always passive. Now, is passiveness a property of an immaterial substance? In my humble opinion just the reverse. For if it were, such a substance must be liable to all the disagreeable sensations of pain, as well as the agreeable sensations of pleasure; must be affected by the excruciating tortures of the stone, as well as the delicious flavour of the pine-apple. Such an inference as this, though it appears to me absurd, nay almost a contradiction in terms, will readily be allowed by the defenders of the soul's immateriality.—Strange, that opposite conclusions should be drawn from the same premises! But if by an immaterial substance we understand a substance which in all its properties is contrary to matter, in what class of existence must we place that substance which receives impressions, or is acted upon by matter? It cannot be immaterial, for such a substance can receive no impression or motion from any external cause, neither in the way of impulse, attraction, percussion, repulsion, or any conceivable manner of communicating motion, or giving to such a substance a different modification from what it had. If then such

effects are produced in any substance however formed, disposed, modified, or placed, I presume, we are fully authorized to affirm, that it must be material. Indeed we cannot conceive how an immaterial substance can have any form, disposition, modification, or place; for these contingencies are applicable to bodies only, and necessarily suppose extension, figure, and relation to other bodies.

10. From the foregoing premises we may now venture to give a *definition of a human being*, a definition which has been attempted by many authors, but, as far as I know, executed in a manner inaccurate, nay even fundamentally wrong. *Man is a creature endowed by his Creator with the faculties of sensation and perception, with reflection or a thinking principle capable of combining the ideas suggested by sensation and perception, into true propositions, civil and moral, with a consciousness that he is obliged by his Creator to make his civil and moral conduct conformable to these propositions.* If we say that man is an animal endowed with sensation, perception, and a thinking faculty, we shall not in this manner distinguish him from many other animals, if what we have ad-

vanced above upon this subject be allowed to be conclusive. It is in his power of investigating *civil and moral truth*, and the consciousness of his being obliged by the Author of his being to conform his conduct to these, *as a member of society and an accountable being*, that we must find the true characteristic definition of man. Any definition which makes the essential characteristic of man to depend upon his figure or external senses, must be, in my opinion, self-evidently wrong. These characteristics in the definition of man, compared with those found in other animals of the brute creation, will enable us to make some observations, connected with our present enquiry.

11. Many animals have the faculties of sensation and perception, apparently more acute and distinct than man; yet nobody, I presume, will contend, that they are not *passive* in both these affections. But when we consider their reflection or thinking faculty, which peculiarly constitutes what we call the soul or mind, we discover a vast superiority in man, not only in the extent, but in the accuracy and precision of the operations of this faculty. In both these cases how wise, how just, how good are the dispensations of Providence!

The sensation, perception, and reflection of the brute animal, are given only to enable him to avoid what might be pernicious or destructive to his being, to enjoy pleasure, and to propagate his species. But man, destined for these and other far superior purposes, to execute the duties of social life here as a member of society, and to enjoy happiness hereafter as a moral agent, has a sense of what is right and wrong, both in his civil and moral capacity. But this comparison has inadvertently led me to make some observations not quite consistent with the title of this section ; though in other respects, I hope, they will be deemed not absolutely foreign to the purpose.

12. I hope it has been proved that man is totally passive both in sensation and perception ; suppose we advance one step farther, and say, with the ancient Peripatetics, that in his reflection or thinking faculty he is both passive and active ; the assertion may, I presume, be proved by experience, and will afford no inconsiderable argument for the materiality of the soul. Is it not essential, in our idea of an immaterial substance, that it *always thinks*? Now, is it not experimentally true, that the soul in profound sleep without dreams

does *not think at all?* In this state it is deprived for a time of what must be considered as its *essential property, thought,* and consequently cannot be immaterial. But when dreams intervene in sleep, it is certainly active, or exercises its voluntary reflecting power, and therefore we may fairly conclude that the mind, in its thinking principle, is both active and passive. I never read Baxter's "Account of Dreams," and therefore cannot say what his doctrine of them is; but the obvious conclusion to be made from this fact is, that if the operation of the thinking faculty can be suspended, or cease, for half an hour, for instance, it is not the property of an immaterial substance, but of a substance which is both active and passive, according to those laws which its Creator has impressed upon it; that is, it is matter with a faculty of thinking. But we need not have recourse to sleep to prove that thinking is sometimes suspended; for daily experience will convince us, that we pass many *waking intervals* in which we are not conscious of having thought at all. Mr Locke allows that the soul always thinks *while we are awake;* but either this ingenious investigator of the properties of the mind must have had a mind

himself more active and more constantly employed than mine, or else we differ in our idea of consciousness. I pretend not to determine absolutely which of these opinions is true, while it is allowed, as it is by this author and others, that the soul does not *always think*; which is all I want to prove now.

13. It was observed before, that if the soul were immaterial, it must be as perfect in all its faculties in an infant, as in the most learned adult. Do the observations we make upon infants, or our own memory in a more advanced period of life, afford any proofs of this original perfection? Just the contrary. From the most accurate observations we can make upon very young infants, we are hardly authorized to affirm that they think at all. When they begin—in Virgil's just and beautiful language, *risu cognoscere matrem*—we may then venture to pronounce that they think. I am far from affirming that such infants do not think, for I am persuaded they have a thinking faculty from their birth; but they certainly shew fewer indications of thought than many brute animals at the same period of life: In this, I am persuaded, we may discover the wise purposes of our Creator.

The mental faculties of infants are incapable of discerning what is either *civilly or morally right or wrong*, and therefore have no occasion for that conviction or consciousness which obliges them to adopt what is right in their conduct; but a brute animal from its birth has occasion for the exercise of those faculties which may enable it to provide for its existence, and secure it from danger. Thus, to instance in domestic animals, a foal, a calf, a lamb, and other young of lactescent creatures, almost as soon as they are produced, if in a healthy state, of themselves apply to the udder of their dam, for that milk which is the support of their being; but an infant in similar circumstances would soon perish, if it were not put to the breast, or supported by some food, which it is incapable of providing for itself. If then, in this early stage of life, we find that the mental faculties of brutes are so far superior to those of the human species, we must conclude, as was observed before, that this is to be referred to the wise appointment of their Creator, who, though he has given them similar faculties, has made this difference in their use, as best adapted to the different purposes of their being.

14. If then we have such clear and experimental proofs of the superiority of the brute creatures to man, in this period of their being, why should we not conclude that their souls are in themselves essentially the same, but destined in man for superior purposes, and therefore in him provided with superior powers? We have proved, or at least attempted to prove, that the superiority of the mental faculties in man to those of many brute animals, depends not upon the essential difference of these faculties, but upon the *different improvement they are capable of admitting*, according to the different purposes of their being, as determined by the Author of their existence. The conclusion therefore deduced from this reasoning before, recurs in its full force, that, that whatever arguments can be alleged for the immateriality and immortality of the human species, will equally prove the immateriality and immortality of the brute species, and consequently that reason shews that in this respect they are upon an equality.

15. Analogy is a mode of argumentation which has been so discredited by the ancient philosophers in treating this subject, that I am afraid the learned reader may be

prejudiced against it. But as the abuse or misapplication of any mode of reasoning is not a sufficient warrant for exploding it, we will venture to add one argument of this kind to others which we have used before. Every thinking being which is not originally in its kind perfect in its mental abilities, admits of an increment of perfection; and whatever admits of an increment, must necessarily admit of a decrement. It was observed before, that the abilities of the human soul admit of great improvement, and hence its materiality was inferred; we now appeal to experience, and affirm, that these faculties likewise admit of a decrease; and as these faculties decrease as the vigour of the body and the acuteness of the external senses decrease, it is evident that they are both of the same substance, that is, both material; and therefore it is analogically probable that they will both die and be dissolved together. This argument is farther confirmed by the concomitant improvement of the faculties of the mind and the senses in the early part of life.

16. The general deduction from the preceding premises is, that the *materiality* of the human soul appears to be *very probable*; but

we readily allow that the point is not demonstrated, or even *can* be demonstrated by reason. We shall therefore proceed to another proof, deduced from revelation, which, if it be found to speak the same language, will authorize us to conclude, that the imperfect discoveries of reason upon this subject are true as far as they go.

A N  
A T T E M P T

To prove the MATERIALITY of the Soul,

By S C R I P T U R E.

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S E C T. II.

I. **B**OOTH sacred and profane writers, when they speak of the thinking faculty in man, his soul, mind, or, as some of them express it, his vital principle, make use of the same terms, and consequently must be supposed to affix the same ideas to these terms, except they inform us to the contrary. Those who have read the ancient Greek and Latin authors, who have either incidentally or expressly treated of the human soul, need not be informed, that the words by which they express it in general convey the idea of materiality. Thus the words *ψυχη*, *ψυχος*, *πνευμα*, *φρεν*, in Greek; and in Latin the words *animus*, *anima*, *spiritus*, *aura*, are words which express *material* substances; and though Plato, in his justly celebrated dialogue, *Phædon*, uses *ψυχη* as signifying an *immaterial* substance, yet in his *Cratylus* he explains *ψυχη* as material, and in *Phædon* evidently assumes the proof of the soul's immateriality; indeed no real proof of it could be given by any efforts of human

reason. Let us then examine whether *revelation* offers such a proof; if it do, *reason* may admit it with confidence and security.

to me, is, that man, as soon as he became a living creature, or as soon as the vital principle of respiration was communicated to him, was capable of executing all the respective functions of his soul and body, capable of sensation, perception, reflection, and voluntary motion. This divine relation of the origin and properties of man is peculiarly interesting, and upon this alone we might, perhaps, *rest the proof of the soul's materiality*; but other passages of scripture shall be examined for this purpose, and, we hope, with equal candour, impartiality, and a sincere desire of investigating the truth. We shall but make one additional remark upon this passage relating to the creation of man, to prove that he is wholly material, and that is, that other animated creatures, or *brutes*, are in the nineteenth verse of the same chapter called *ψυχαι ζωαι*, living souls.

3. If this account of the faculties and powers of man in his primitive state be true, as we find by experience that he is now possessed of the same faculties and powers, how can we reconcile this with *the doctrine of original sin*, as explained by some modern writers? Adam was certainly a moral and accountable agent as we are; a prohibition, as such, was

imposed upon him by his Creator, not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. He disobeyed this injunction, and what was the consequent punishment? Mortality. But does the Mosaical relation of this transaction give us reason to conclude, that any essential change or alteration was made in the faculties of his mind? It seems, indeed, that this offence subjected him to a new sensation, a sensation of *physical evil*; for the allegorical meaning of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil cannot be the knowledge of *moral* good and evil, for that Adam certainly had from his creation. And as he could not have had a sense of physical evil, without a previous sense of physical good, the tree is called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, that is, of pleasure, which he had before, and of pain, which he was now made liable to by his disobedience to the command of his Creator, and of its consequence, death. We may then, I hope, safely conclude, that all the dreadful consequence of Adam's original sin upon us is no more than it was upon him; that we are subject to a temporal death, or dissolution. This reasoning, I flatter myself, is fully established by Paul's comparison of the disadvantages and advantages we derive from the first

and second Adam. But, perhaps, no great stress is to be laid upon Adam's original sin as related in the beginning of Genesis, which some authors, I believe, consider as a traditional fable, or allegory. But whether it be fabulous, or only metaphorical, it will not, I apprehend, affect my conclusion deduced from it, that is, that Adam was a moral voluntary agent, subjected to death for disobedience to the command of his Creator; and that his descendants are similar agents, and subject to death likewise, but *not on account of his transgression*, but by the will and appointment of our common Creator; established as a law of our nature *before our existence*, and consequently excluding any supposition of its being inflicted upon us *as a punishment*. Granting then, that Adam was created capable of immortality, will it necessary follow from hence that his soul was immaterial, and was therefore in itself immortal? By no means. For this immortality depended, we are told, upon eating of the tree of life, and consequently rather proves, that he was a purely material creature. It is hardly necessary to add, that the expression in the Septuagint which we translate *for ever*—*εις τον αιωνα*—Gen. iii. 22, never signifies an

actual indeterminable duration, except when it is applied to the Supreme Being.

4 Part of the sentence denounced against Adam is, in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till *thou return* unto the ground, for *dust thou art*, and *unto dust shalt thou return*. Gen. iii. 19. If by the personal pronoun *thou* (implied, but not expressed in the Septuagint) the writer only means the sensitive part of man, his body, the expression is very inaccurate, and contrary to the application of personal pronouns in all languages which I have any knowledge of. But I have not the least reason to suppose that Moses used it in this limited sense, but intended to express by it the whole person, the whole of man, both body and soul. If any part of man had an exclusive right to be characterized by a personal pronoun, it would certainly be the thinking part, or soul; for it is a very pertinent observation made by some of the ancient Greek philosophers, —Σὺν τῷ φυκῷ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου σὺ, —the soul is *thou*, but the *body* is *thine*. And Cicero's similar remark, *mens cuiusque est quisque*. This passage then proves that man is a sensitive and rational creature, was made *entirely* of matter, and after death must *entirely* return to matter again. This conclusion cannot be

evaded, without destroying all grammatical propriety of language, and introducing confusion into that part of it—*personal pronouns*—which is peculiarly definite and specific. It is not much to our present purpose to observe, that the pronoun of the second person, *thou*, is not only more definite, but more significant and emphatical, than the pronoun of the third person, *he*, as will readily appear by substituting the latter in the place of the former, in the passage from Genesis quoted above.

5. I shall contrast a passage in Ecclesiastes with this, which is apparently different in meaning. Then shall the dust return to the earth, as it was; and the *spirit* shall return to God who gave it. Eccles. xii. 7. The word *spiritus* in this passage is evidently of the same precise signification as the word *nous* in the seventh verse of the second chapter of Genesis, cited before. In this passage then, it must be considered as implying no more than is expressed in the similar text in Genesis, that is, that at death the vital principle, or respiration, is taken away by the Creator of man, who gave it to him. But it may be asked, why is it not said, that *all* the faculties of man, both of his soul and body, return to God, who un-

doubtedly gave them all alike? It appears that the author of Ecclesiastes expressed himself in this manner that his account of the death of man might correspond to Moses's account of his creation; who says, that God formed man out of the dust of the earth, and then breathed into him the breath of life, or gave him a *νέφα, πνεύμα,* or faculty of vital respiration. We shall have occasion in the sequel to mention the signification of some of the derivatives of the verb *πνέω,* but may venture to affirm here, that the derivative *πνεύμα in particular,* has never in the Bible the signification of any immaterial substance, but when it is applied to the first and only immaterial self-existent cause of all things, God. I hope the reader will not consider this as the rash assertion of mere prejudice, but candidly suspend his determination upon the author's opinion in this matter, till he has examined his proofs of it.

6. What man is he that liveth, and shall not see death? shall he deliver his soul from the hand of the grave? Psalm lxxxix. 48. If none but his Creator can deliver the *ψυχή,* or soul of man, from the grave, what is the inference to be made from this? Evidently, that

his soul is material, and perishable as his body. The author in this psalm, after having recounted the favours and blessings which were promised to him by the Almighty, in human language, expostulates with him upon the reverse of his fortune, upon the calamities and disasters he suffered from his enemies, and then adds,—Remember how short my time is, wherefore hast thou made all men in vain? v. 47. But how could he say, that his time was short, or that he was made in vain, if he thought that his soul was immaterial? His reasoning, as it is, appears rather impious; but upon this supposition it would have been absurd as well as impious. There are many more passages in this author which contain similar sentiments, some of which may perhaps be considered in the following part of this section. At present we shall only observe, that the word *ψυχή* in the remarkable prophetic passage in Psalm xvi. 10, is so far from expressing a thinking vital principle which *survived the body*, that it must be understood to mean a substance *absolutely dead*, inanimate, and motionless. Thou wilt not leave my soul in the grave, i. e. thou wilt not suffer my vital principle to be extinguished by death, and totally cease in the grave; but wilt re-

animate my body, as I firmly believe (v. 9.) and not suffer it finally to be corrupted or dissolved. This sense of the word *ψυχή* occurs in other passages in the Bible, as Levit. xix. 28, Ye shall not make any cuttings in your flesh for *the dead*, *μετριψαντας*; and xxi. 1, 11, There shall none be defiled for *the dead*, *μετριψαντας*—neither shall he go into any *dead body*, *ψυχης*—whosoever is defiled by *the dead*, *μετριψαντας*. Numb. v. 2; and xi. 10—if any man of you, or your posterity, shall be unclean by reason of a *dead body*, *ψυχης*. This sense of the word *ψυχή* is found in its Latin synonyme, *anima*.

animaque sepulchro  
Condimus. —————— VIRG. Æn. 3; and again,  
Itē, ait, ègregias animal, quæ fanguine nobis  
Hanc patriam peperere suo, decorate supremis  
Muneribus. —————— Æn. II.

This application of these two words expressing the soul or thinking faculty of man, clearly proves that the respective authors thought it material and perishable as the rest of the body.

7. There is hope of a tree, if it be cut down, that it will sprout again, and that the tender branch thereof will not cease. But man dieth and wasteth away; yea man giveth up the ghost, and where is he? So man lieth

down, and riseth not, till the heavens be no more, they shall not awake, nor be raised out of their sleep. Job xiv. 7, 10, 12. Can any language be more clearly expressive of the materiality, and consequent mortality of man, than what is contained in these verses? They assert that man shall die, shall be nowhere, or have no existence again, till the heavens be no more, or till the resurrection. This doctrine, I presume, we shall find consonant to the general tenor of scripture upon the same subject. That man will sleep in the dust, or be in a state of insensibility, till he be recalled into being, is, if I be not mistaken, the uniform language of sacred writ. But this conclusion is rather premature, as the premises which authorise it have not yet been properly and fully examined. We will therefore proceed to other proofs, which may tend to establish it.

8. The twenty-second verse of the last cited chapter of Job, contains as specific a distinction between the body and mind, as, I believe, can be found in scripture. His flesh upon him shall have pain, and his soul within him shall mourn. Job xiv. 22. In this sentence the author makes a proper discrimina-

tion between the sensitive and rational part of man; but by no means proves that the latter is immaterial, because he expresses it by the term *ψυχή*, which we found above is applied to brutes. Every person of a cultivated understanding, who, like Job, reflects upon the different properties of the mind and body, would perhaps conclude that they were substances essentially different. The body he discovers to be organized matter, and an object of the senses; the mind, on the contrary, is not an object of sense, and therefore he may conclude, *but without proof*, that it is not organized matter, but a substance directly contrary to material or sensible substances, that is, immaterial. A man of reflection will soon arrive at such a conclusion as this, though deduced from premises taken for granted, if he be desirous of immortality, and cannot conceive how he can possibly gain this but by means of an immaterial substance, or soul, which, as it is supposed to be simple and uncompounded, cannot admit of death or dissolution. Thus we often too readily think that to be true, or right, which we wish to be so. But Job, I am persuaded, entertained no such opinion of the soul; for he

afterwards expresses himself in a manner very different from what that opinion would have dictated. All flesh shall perish together, and man shall turn again unto dust. Job xxxiv. 15. But we must not omit another passage in this author, which, in our translation at least, seems to speak a different language. I know that my Redeemer liveth, and that he shall stand at the latter day upon the earth. And though after my skin worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh I shall see God. Job xix. 25, 26. The Hebrew, as translated in the margin of some of our English Bibles, gives the twenty-sixth verse in these words,—After I shall awake, though this *body* (a word added by the translator, as I conclude from the manner of printing it) be destroyed, yet out of my flesh shall I see God. My Septuagint, in this passage, is to me rather unintelligible, but seems to exhibit a sense far different, both to the common English translation, and the translation from the Hebrew in the margin; so that upon the whole I can make no particular inference from it. But upon a supposition that our English translation is right, the general inference to be made from it is, that the author was persuaded that after he was

reduced to dust in the grave, God would restore him to life again at the resurrection of the dead. It contains no intimation of his supposing, that he had an immaterial substance, which was exempt from death, and which would be united to his body again at the resurrection. But this passage must not be considered as to our purpose; if it be understood in the sense in which most of the ancient commentators understood it, i. e. That Job expresses his firm hope and confidence that God would restore him to temporal health and prosperity.

9. That which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts, even one thing befalleth them: as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all *one breath*—spirit, *νηστις*, so that a man hath no pre-eminence above a beast; for all is vanity. All go unto one place, all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again. Who knoweth the spirit of the man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth? Eccles. iii. 19, 20, 21.—Whatever idea the writer of this affixed to the word which we have translated *spirit*, it is evident he considered it as one and the same both in man and beast. And we

may again make the same inference as was made in the preceding section, i. e. That if men have an immaterial, and therefore immortal soul, brutes have such a soul too. There is some difference between the sense of our translation of the twenty-first verse, and that of the Septuagint. If our translation be right, the author seems to have considered the vital breath, or ~~spiritus~~, according to the *different figures* of man and beast, as characterised by Ovid:

Pronaque cum spectent animalia cætera terram,  
Os homini sublime dedit.—

If the Septuagint translation give the true sense, it will imply that doctrine which the same author inculcates in Eccles. xii. 7, quoted before, with this difference, that it is expressed here hypothetically. If either of these translations exhibit the true sense of the passage, it will be equally conclusive for our argument, as it asserts that there is no difference between the brutal and human spirit as to their nature, and that neither of them are immaterial. It may be said perhaps, that the author of Ecclesiastes, though he was eminently distinguished for his learning and wisdom, was not an inspired writer, and therefore not of competent

authority in this matter; we may reply, that if other authors, whose inspiration cannot be doubted, express themselves in the same manner upon this point, their sentiments must, at least, be allowed to contain the *popular* opinion of the times when they wrote. If the reader wish to have any more information respecting this passage in Ecclesiastes, I must beg leave to refer him to the ingenious Mr Locke's observations upon it, as quoted from his letters to the Bishop of Worcester, in the fourth book on the Human Understanding. Upon this supposition of man's materiality, and consequent mortality, how beautifully apposite are the many allusions in scripture to the duration of his life! His days are an hand's breadth, and his age as nothing before God—his flesh is as grass, and all his glory as the flower of grass—and he fades away as a leaf—he flieth also as a shadow—his days are swifter than a post—they pass away as the swift ships—as a tale that is told—his life is even as a vapour, that appeareth for a little time, and then vanisheth away—that he dwelleth in a house of clay, whose foundation is in the dust, &c.

10. The vital principle in brute animals, and even reptiles, is in the first chapter of Genesis

repeatedly expressed by the word ψυχή. And when the author of Leviticus mentions the prohibition of eating the blood of animals, he assigns as a reason for this, that the blood is the *life*, ψυχή, of every animal; that is, the blood which circulates by means of the πνεύμα which the Creator originally breathed into their nostrils. In a figurative sense, this word is used for *what supports life*, or *food*, particularly *bread*. No man shall take the nether or the upper millstone to pledge; for he taketh a *man's life* (ψυχή) to pledge. Deut. xxiv. 6. Wilt thou hunt the prey for the lion? or fill the *appetite* (ψυχαρίς) of the young lion? Job xxxviii. 39. Here ψυχή is used for the *life* or *vital principle*, which is supported by food.

11. He made a way to his anger, *he spared not their soul from death*—~~εκ οὐσίας τοι απέστη την ψυχὴν αὐτῶν~~. Sept. Psalm lxxviii. 50. Here the ψυχή, or soul of man, is expressly declared to be *mortal*, and consequently not *immaterial*. The same ideas are affixed to this term in the New Testament, as will be evident from the following instances.—They are dead who sought the young child's *life*, τὴν ψυχὴν. Matt. ii. 20. Is it lawful to do good on the sabbath-day, or to do evil? to save *life*, ψυχή, or to kill? Mark iii. 4, and Luke vi. 9. In both

these passages the word ψυχή signifies the vital principle, the soul, or thinking invisible part of man; ψυχή τοῦ σώματος is contrasted with σῶμα, and thus its sense is clearly defined. Take no thought for your life, τὴν ψυχήν, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink; nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on: Is not the life (ψυχή) more than meat, and the body than raiment? Matt. vi. 25, and Luke xii. 22. In these texts the word ψυχή has the same sense as in those quoted immediately before, and contrasted with σῶμα, the external visible body: the former, Jesus tells his disciples, requires meat and drink to support it in its existence (and therefore must be material); the latter requires cloaths to defend it from the inclemency of the weather. From these, and many other passages, which might be mentioned in confirmation of this sense of the word ψυχή in the Bible, the reader, I hope, may safely conclude with me, that the authors who have applied it in this manner, had no idea of its signifying any thing immaterial.

12. Many of the ancient philosophers considered man as composed of *spirit*, *soul*, and *body*; a division which Paul has adopted in 1 Thess. v. 23; and by ψυχή they understood

the *animal soul*, the seat of the passions and appetites ; and in this sense its derivative, ~~soul~~, is used in many passages of scripture. I shall not insist upon this supposition of the soul's *visibility* and consequent *materiality*, as I am persuaded that considering the soul or mind as *distinct* or *different*, according as it *exerts its different faculties*, has introduced great confusion into our real knowledge of its properties ; for it is the \* *whole mind* which is employed in

\* It is with the utmost diffidence that I venture to express my dissent upon this occasion, from the opinion of so truly respectable and ingenious a metaphysician as Dr Priestley, who, in the second section of his *Philosophical Necessity*, considers the motives and determinations of the mind, as *causes and effects*. For as, in my opinion, it is the *whole mind* which examines motives, and the *whole mind* which—I agree with him—*necessarily* determines according to those motives ; I cannot conceive why the mind, in this respect, must not be considered both as *cause and effect*, according to Dr Priestley's opinion ; a conclusion which appears to me as inadmissible in the intellectual as in the natural world. But perhaps I may have mistaken the author's sentiments upon this subject, and referred the cause of determination to the mind itself, which he ascribes to those fixed immutable laws impressed upon our mental faculties by our Creator, whom he seems to consider as the cause of this determination. Should this be the case, I am still incapable of conceiving how the human mind is *free in any respect*, as I apprehend those fixed immutable laws must necessarily extend to the *whole mind*. The freedom of the mind, according to my conception, depends upon its *free uncontroled power of examining motives*, but that the determination or volition in consequence of this examination is *necessary* ; in other words, That the *mind is free in examination, necessary in determination*.

I did not intend to have said more upon this subject at present ; but the supposition that I may have mistaken Dr Priestley's opinion, and not explained my own with sufficient perspicuity, induces me to make a few additional observations upon this important doctrine. Man is certainly *accountable for his determinations or actions as a moral agent*, and I cannot conceive how he can be such an agent,

every perception, reflection, volition, and in every passion. The body, or the organized external senses, cannot be the seat of the passions, as has been observed before; and when in the New Testament the ~~spiritual~~, carnal, and ~~spiritual~~, sensual, are considered as criminal, it is to be understood merely as conformable to the popular opinion of the body being the seat of criminal passions, which cannot be affirmed with the least plausibility of any passions, excepting those which are animal, and are

without an absolute freedom of will in some respect or other. I suppose that this freedom consists in his power of examining the motives of action or sentiment, and that he will be rewarded or punished in a future life according as he makes a proper or improper use of this power as a moral agent. In matters of importance, and which admit of deliberation, the exercise of this power is experimentally proved; and the consequent determination, though necessary, as I admit, will be always right in morality and religion, when it is fully and properly applied. In most of our temporal concerns, the determination of the mind must necessarily follow the greater apparent good, as we have no fixed certain rule to guide our examination. In every case, and at all times, I agree with Dr Priestley, that the mind cannot determine contrary to the motives or reasons then under consideration, and that Ovid's—*video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor*—is impossible; but I conceive it has a power of examining the motives of action, and of suspending its determination, till these motives be properly canvassed. From a full conviction of such a power existing in the mind, I argue that it is free, and have no experimental proof of any other freedom.

Considering that liberality of sentiment which has always characterised the author of the doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated—whose consent to prefix his justly celebrated name to this trifling piece I shall always esteem a favour—I am persuaded he will not be displeased with these free and candid observations upon his opinion in this matter, which, upon all subjects, I consider with that deference and respect which are fully due to his peculiarly eminent learning and abilities.

found in the brute creation; such particularly as relate to physical pleasure, in which the body is peculiarly instrumental. But in these cases is the perception of pleasure in the body? Certainly not. Why then are we commanded in scripture to mortify the body, to keep it in subjection, &c.? Because when the body is not criminally indulged, its sensations conveyed to the mind will not be so strong and powerful, and consequently will not excite so strong a desire of gratification.

13. It has been observed before, that the word *spiritus* never expresses an immaterial substance, but when it is applied to the Supreme Being; but as this word is generally supposed to express more particularly the mind or thinking faculty of man, we shall select a few more passages of scripture to ascertain its meaning with greater precision.—And they told him (Jacob) saying, Joseph is yet alive, and he is governor over all the land of Egypt. And Jacob's heart fainted, for he believed them not. And they told him all the words of Joseph, which he had said unto them; and when he saw the waggons which Joseph had sent to carry him, the *spirit*, *spiritus*, of Jacob their father revived. Gen. xlvi. 26, 27. This

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passage contains a very beautiful and natural account of the effects which the surprising and unexpected news of his son's being yet alive, and possessed of great honours in Pharaoh's court, had upon the mind of his father Jacob. He immediately swooned, or fainted, from the great perturbation with which his mind was agitated, *εγένετο τη διάρροια*. Had he died upon this occasion, as some in both the extremes of joy and grief are said to have done, the historian would not have expressed this perturbation of mind by *εγένετο τη διάρροια*, but by *εξαπνοίας*; and accordingly we are told in the next verse, that his spirit, *πνεύμα*, or power of respiration, *returned*, and that he revived; that is, his power of respiration, or, if you please, his animation, was suspended; but if respiration or animation depend upon an immaterial substance, I cannot conceive how it can be suspended by any fortuitous cause, much less how it can absolutely cease. Jacob's recovery of his mental faculties is expressed in the Septuagint by a figurative word, which is very emphatical, *ἀνζυπνός*; a word which at once conveys an idea that his thinking faculty was *suspended*, and *not extinguished*. This will enable us to give a proper definition of *death*,

which is a total privation of the power of breathing, or respiration; and not, as Plato and many modern authors define it, a separation of the soul and body. The word spirit, *πνεύμα*, is used in a sense similar to this in the following passage. And he (Sampson) was sore a-thirst, and called on the Lord, and said, Thou hast given this great deliverance into the hand of thy servant, and now shall I die for thirst, and fall into the hand of the uncircumcised? But God clave an hollow place that was in the jaw, and there came water thereout; and when he had drank, his spirit, *πνεύμα*, came again, and he revived. Deut. xv. 18, 19. That is, Sampson was almost fainting with thirst till he drank the water thus miraculously produced, and then his vital powers, his strength, and bodily functions, were restored. And when he had eaten, his spirit, *πνεύμα*, came again to him; for he had eaten no bread, nor drank any water, three days and three nights. 1 Sam. xxx. 12. The sense of the word *spirit* here, is so fully coincident with its sense in the passages just quoted, that no farther observations upon it are necessary. When the queen of Sheba had heard Solomon's wife answers to all her enquiries, and

seen the splendor and magnificence of his court and buildings, our translation says—  
There was no more spirit in her—the Septuagint expresses this by *εκ πνεύματος*, which requires no comment.

14. There is a *spirit* in man, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding. Job xxxii. 8. There is a vital or thinking principle in man, to which the Almighty has given a faculty of reflection; but it does not imply by any means that he has given this faculty a power of self-existence, or immateriality. For this author observes in the 34th chapter—If he set his heart upon man, if he gather unto himself his spirit and his breath, ~~πνεῦμα~~; all flesh shall perish together, and man shall turn again unto dust; Verse 14, 15.—Put not your trust in princes, nor in the son of man, in whom there is no help. His breath, ~~πνεῦμα~~, goeth forth, he returneth to his earth, and in that very day his thoughts perish. Psalm cxlvi. 3, 4.—The Lord who stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundation of the earth, and *formeth the spirit* of man within him. Zach. xii. 1. The participle of the verb, which in our translation is *formeth*, evidently proves that the spirit is

material; for ~~πλάσσων~~, or any other verb which implies shape or figure, cannot be applied to immaterial substances. The prophet is here describing some of the great works of the Creator, and observing the order in which they are arranged in the Mosaic account, closes his narrative with man's creation. See Gen. ii. 7, 8, where the same verb is used to express the original formation of man. When John the Baptist began his public ministry, and crowds of Jews went to him to be baptized, addressing himself to the Sadducees and Pharisees particularly, he advises them not to depend so confidently upon the promises of God made to Abraham, because they were his descendants; for if they did not imitate his faith and piety, God would certainly reject them; as he was so far from being obliged to confer the promises upon them, because they were descended from Abraham, that if he pleased, the Baptist declares, pointing to some stones, that he was able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham, Matt. iii. 9. Luke iii. 8. Nobody will doubt God's power to effect what the Baptist asserts in this passage; and I only quote it to prove, that Omnipotence can make a sensitive rational creature,

or man, of a stone; or, that such a creature is wholly material.

15. Watch and pray, that ye enter not into temptation; the spirit, *πνεύμα*, indeed is willing, but the flesh, *φρέσκος*, is weak. Matt. xxvi. 41, and Mark xiv. 31. Spirit here means a virtuous disposition of mind, but not so confirmed as to be exempt from the influence of the passions, particularly those of hope or fear of temporal good or ill. This sense appears to be confirmed by Paul—And I, brethren, could not speak unto you, as unto spiritual, *πνευματικούς*, but as as unto carnal, *φρεσκίους*, even as to babes in Christ. I Cor. iii. 1. Rom. vii. 14.

16. The words which I speak unto you they are *spirit*, *πνεύμα*, and they are *life*, *ζωή*. John vi. 63. My doctrine, which upon this occasion I have called the bread which came down from heaven, the living bread, is to be understood *figuratively*; and when I said ye were to eat my flesh, and drink my blood, ye must understand these expressions in the same manner; for my doctrine is spiritual, and calculated not for the support of corporeal life, but to prepare men for eternal life. In this sense, I believe, most commentators un-

derstand this passage; but I presume it may fairly admit of a different interpretation, which will, at once, be consistent with the context, and the present argument. We find in the history before this verse, that Jesus, in his teaching the Jews at the synagogue of Capernaum, had made use of highly figurative language to express the nature of his doctrine and mission. He calls himself the *bread of life*—the *living bread* which came down from heaven,—the words which I speak unto you, they are spirit, and they are life. Bread is called, by way of eminence, the support of the *vital principle*,  $\psi\pi\mu$ , or,  $\tau\pi\mu\mu\alpha$ ; the bread that came down from heaven, is Christ or his doctrine; and this doctrine, he affirms in the sixty-third verse, is spirit,  $\tau\pi\mu\mu\alpha$ , and life,  $\zeta\alpha$ , i. e. not only *temporal* but *eternal life*. The word  $\zeta\alpha$  is used to express *eternal life* in every passage, I believe, where such an existence is specified; more frequently alone, than in conjunction with the epithet  $\tau\pi\mu\mu\alpha$ . Though this interpretation of the word  $\tau\pi\mu\mu\alpha$  is not inconsistent with the sense in which it, or its synonyme  $\psi\pi\mu$ , is used in other passages, as we have proved before, yet it may perhaps be objected that Christ mentions no *temporal*

sanctions of his religion. To refute this, I will not insist upon 1 Tim. iv. 8,—Godliness is profitable unto all things, having promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come,—which some understand as referring to the Jewish and Christian dispensations, though, in my opinion, without sufficient proof; but I will rest my sense of *temporal* sanctions, or *motives* at least, as constituting a part of the religion of Christ, upon his own doctrine, as delivered by Matthew, vi. 25,—Take no thought (that is, comparatively speaking, take no thought) for *your life*, *nor yet your raiment*, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink; nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on: Is not the life more than meat, and the body than raiment? But seek ye first the kingdom of God, and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you.—Mark x. 29, 30, contains a promise to sincere believers, of comfort, support, assistance, and consolation, *καὶ καὶ τότε*, now, *in this time*; which certainly is a *temporal* promise, or a promise confined to this life merely; and Christ's doctrine delivered to his disciples in Matthew xix. 27, 30, and in the parallel passages of Mark x. 28, 31, and Luke xviii. 28,

30, contains a more full and explicit promise of those rewards which his faithful followers might expect *in this life*, *ν το ναόν της*, as well as those which they might hope for *in the life to come*, *ν το αἰών το ἔχοντος*. If it be alleged that these temporal promises are to be understood figuratively, I readily grant it; but it must be allowed at the same time, that whatever good things they were intended to express, were to be enjoyed *in this life*, *ν το ναόν της*, and therefore they must be considered as promises merely *temporal*. When Christ commissioned his apostles to preach the doctrine of repentance to the lost sheep of the house of Israel, his injunctions to them, before their departure upon this embassy, are, Provide neither gold, nor silver, nor brass in your purses, nor scrip for your journey, neither two coats, neither shoes, nor yet staves,—for the workman is worthy of his meat, Matt. x. 10; which certainly contains an indirect temporal promise, that these necessaries would be added unto them: And Paul, conformably to this doctrine, asserts (1 Cor. 9, 4), That the Lord had ordained that they who preach the Gospel should live of the Gospel. Upon the whole, the *temporal* promise which Christ makes

the sincere believers and practisers of his religion, is a due supply of the necessaries of life, without any *particular* anxiety or provision on their part; (according to the Psalmist's experience,—I have been young, but now am old; yet have I not seen the righteous forsaken, nor his seed begging bread. Psalm xxxvii. 25) and to his apostles in particular, as more immediately and more constantly engaged in their ministerial offices, a supply of these necessaries without *any* provision or labour for them.

17. And the child (Jesus) grew, and waxed strong in spirit. Luke i. 80. It has been observed in the first section, that immaterial substances admit not of either *more or less, increase or decrease, better or worse, in any respect*. In the next chapter, this historian explains what he means here by *μεγαλύτεροι πνεύματι*, by adding that Jesus was *πληρωμός σορώς*. v. 40. They were terrified and affrighted, and supposed they had seen a *spirit*, (*φαντάσμα*, *an apparition*, as it should have been translated). And he said unto them, why are ye troubled, and why do thoughts arise in your hearts? Behold my hands and my feet, that it is I myself; handle me and see, for a

*Spirit*, πνεῦμα, hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have. Luke xxiv. 37, 38, 39. Whatever is meant by φαίλεται in this place, πνεῦμα is synonymous to it, and affords us a remarkable and pertinent proof of the sense in which Jesus and his contemporaries used the word πνεῦμα, spirit. Spirit they conceived to be a subtle, shadowy, material substance, visible but not tangible; for such in all ages has been the vulgar opinion of spirits and apparitions.—*Tenues fine corpore vitas.*

Ter frustra comprehensa manus effugit imago,  
Par levibus ventis, volucrque similiima somno.

VIRG.

—————ιστάρ τούτην' εἴδετο Φρίσος μερμηρίζεις  
Μέτρος ἄκρης ψυχῆς εἰλεῖν κατατθεντίσκων  
Τρίς μετ' εφιρρηψην ελεῖσι τε με θύμος αγαγεῖ  
Τρίς δὲ μοι τε χειρῶν σκία εἰκόνος η καὶ απέραν  
Επίθαι'. —————

Hom.

It does not appear that they thought it differed from common organized matter, but only in density; and that, in consequence of its tenuity, it was not tangible. Their idea of such a body was certainly inconsistent, and unphilosophical; but vulgar opinions, indeed, are seldom derived from philosophy: and the belief of the existence of spirits, or apparitions, is not deduced either from philosophical or rational principles. Perhaps some over zealous christians may be offended, because I take

it for granted that Jesus was liable to vulgar errors; but I can see no reason why they should be alarmed at such an assertion, for he was not sent into the world to reform mankind in their \* *philosophical* but their *moral* belief. It is neither to our present purpose, nor is it easy to account for the origin of the belief of apparitions; it seems to be the creature of a strong imagination, influenced by a guilty conscience, and propagated by ignorance and fear. It is obvious, that in proportion to the improvements made in a rational investigation of the laws of nature, and the moral government of the Supreme Being, the belief of apparitions has regularly decreased. But no stress is to be laid upon popular opinions of this kind, however dignified the person may be who advances them, or however sacred the book in which they are found.

### 18. God is a spirit, *πνεύμα*, and they who worship him must worship him *in spirit*,

\* That Christ did not know, or at least did not correct some vulgar errors which prevailed among the Jews during his ministry, is evident in the case of *demoniacs*. He treats and addresses these unhappy sufferers as if he really thought they were possessed by demons, as was then generally believed; but Dr Lardner, Mr Farmer, and other modern authors, have proved, I think satisfactorily, that these *demoniacs* were in general *lunatic* or *epileptic* patients.

" τῷ οὐρανῷ, and in truth. John iv. 24. That is, God is a spiritual, purely immaterial Being as opposed to man, and other animals, who are ~~not~~, *flesh*, material,—and they who worship him ought to worship him spiritually and truly; that is, with *proper devotion of mind and sincerity*. Had John in this passage given a definition of man instead of his Creator, I have no doubt but he would have expressed himself thus,—*οὐκ εἰσιντος*, or *οὐκ εἰς αὐτὸν εἰσιντος*. In the above quotation from John, *εἶναι*, applied to God, may perhaps signify, that he is the only Being who has life in himself, or is self-existent: It is evident, at least, that its signification, when applied to *him personally*, must be very different from what it is, when applied, in the subsequent part of the sentence, to express *that disposition of mind* with which his worshipers ought to approach him. Hence God is styled in scripture *ἀθάνατος, immortal,* and man just the contrary, *θάνατος, mortal, corruptible*; and if these words have any meaning, they express beings of a genus directly contrary, immaterial and material, immortal and mortal. But it is unnecessary to examine every passage in scripture relating to the mortality of man, as they all exhibit one invari-

able meaning; that is, *that man, the whole man, is material and mortal.* We shall therefore proceed immediately to the examination of the fifteenth chapter of Paul's first Epistle to the Corinthians, which contains a more particular account of the nature of man, both in this world and the next, than any other part of sacred writ.

19. *Text,* 1 Cor. xv. 42, &c. It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption. It is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power. It is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body. There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body. And so it is written, The first man, Adam, was made a living soul; the last Adam was made a quickening spirit. Howbeit, that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural, and afterward that which is spiritual. The first man is of the earth, earthly; the second man is the Lord from heaven. As is the earthly, such are they also who are earthly; and as is the heavenly, such are they also who are heavenly. And as we have born the image of the earthly, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly.

*Paraphrase.* Man is born liable to corruption in every part; the just will be raised

with bodies not liable to corruption. Man is born apparently in a state of dishonour, but the just will be raised to a state of glory: he is born weak and feeble, but will be raised strong and powerful. Man is born an animal body, the just will be raised with spiritual bodies; there is an animal, and there is a spiritual body. Thus it is written, the first man Adam was created with a vital faculty of respiration, the last Adam was created with a power of communicating this vital faculty to others. But the spiritual, the incorruptible body, was not first, but the animal body, (which requires a constant supply of food and air for its support,) and afterwards that which is spiritual. The first man was made of matter, material, and therefore he and all his descendants were liable to mortality; the second man is the Lord from heaven, now cloathed with a spiritual or immortal body. Those who are descended from the material man, have, like him, merely animal life; but those who sincerely practise the doctrine of Christ, will be raised by him to a heavenly, spiritual, and immortal life. And as in the animal mortal state, in which we are born, we resemble the first

corruptible Adam, so also at the resurrection of the just we shall, in our spiritual immortal body, resemble the second Adam, the Lord from heaven.

*Notes.* V. 42. Man's animated body, that is, the whole man, is now in a state which is liable to corruption, *καὶ φθορά*, consequently he is material; but at the resurrection of the just, this body will be changed into a spiritual and immortal substance. V. 44. Man is born an animal body, *σωμα ψυχικόν*; which, as an animated material substance, requires air and food to continue it in being; but at the resurrection, this gross body will be changed into one more pure and spiritual, which will require no alimentary nourishment for its support. We must observe here, that Paul uses *τηλευτικός*, in the popular sense then affixed to it, to express a substance attenuated, almost evanescent, at least, as explained before, though visible not tangible. V. 45. The first Adam was *ψυχη ζῶσα*, an animated, breathing, thinking creature, which required the assistance of meat, drink, cloathing, &c. to sustain its existence; the last Adam, or Christ, on the contrary, is a Being endowed by his Creator with a power of giving both temporal and eternal animation to man, that is, he has

a power of life, *την ζωήν.* V. 46. But man's spiritual or heavenly existence does not precede his animal existence. 47. The first man Adam was created of the dust of the earth, material; but the second man, Christ, who will invest the just with immortal bodies at the resurrection, was of heavenly extraction, and originally immortal.

We may observe here, that the reading in our common Greek Testaments, *ο Κύριος είς σπάντα*, is in some copies *εἰς σπάντα, σπάντος*, which certainly makes a more consistent opposition between this and the preceding part of the verse. But which ever reading be authentic, they equally afford a strong proof of the *pre-existence* of Christ. He is denominated here *σπάντος*, a term, I apprehend, *not properly applicable* to him when he will exercise his *ζωτικήν*, power, at the resurrection of the righteous—for flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God.

—V. 50. V. 48 and 49. The descendants of an earthly parent are like him in this life, earthly, material, and consequently corruptible; but the righteous, who will be restored to life in a future state by Christ, will be like him, heavenly, and incorruptible. This manner of man's existence in a future state neces-

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sarily supposes an existence different from this present, otherwise how can we account for that *change in this respect* expressed in the fifty-first verse?

20. *Text, v. 50, &c.* Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption. Behold, I shew you a mystery; we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump (for the trumpeter shall sound), and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed. For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality. So when this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal shall have put on immortality, then shall be brought to pass the saying which is written, Death is swallowed up in victory.

*Paraphrase. v. 50, &c.* It is asked by some who doubt of a resurrection, with what bodies the dead are raised; to this I answer, that frail, material, perishable bodies, such as we have at present, cannot enter into the kingdom which the just will inherit hereafter; for such corruptible bodies are not adapted to

a state of incorruption. Add to this—what has not yet been discovered—that we shall not all die, but we shall all be changed in the twinkling of an eye, at the sound of the last trumpet (for the trumpet will sound), and the righteous will be changed. For this corruptible body must put on incorruption, and this mortal body must put on immortality. So when this corruptible and mortal frame shall have put on incorruption and immortality, then will be fulfilled what was spoken by the prophet Hosea, Death is completely conquered, exterminated, so that there shall be no more death.

*Notes.* v. 50, &c. This I affirm, brethren, that man in his material state, consisting of flesh and blood, and other corruptible parts, cannot inherit, can have no title to, a state of incorruptibility. Observe, I tell you a mystery, *μυστήριον*, *what you have not been told before*. (It is needless to cite any proofs of this sense of the word *μυστήριον*, though it has, and indeed continues to be strangely perverted by some writers who are styled *orthodox*.)—Though we are all mortal, yet we shall not all pass through death to a state of immortality, but we shall undergo such a change as will prepar-

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us for that state. What will this change consist in? We are now material and mortal creatures, we shall then be changed into spiritual and immortal. But if our soul or thinking faculty be immaterial now, what change can it undergo? None; for upon this supposition, it is incapable of change, so far as we have any idea of immaterial substances. But if we believe the Apostle, man will be restored to life, and changed into a very different creature from what he is at present; at present he is *corruptible*, *φθαρτος*, but then he will be *incorruptible*, in his exemption from incorruptibility, resembling his Creator, who is likewise styled *αφθαρτος*, but certainly with this difference, that God has incorruptibility in himself, but that man's is the gift of God. For this corruptible and mortal body, at the resurrection of the just, will be invested with incorruptibility and immortality, and then death will be no more.

Mr Locke, and other learned commentators, contend that *το φθαρτον τυπον*, and *το θνητον τυπον*, are to be understood personally, this *corruptible man* and this *mortal man*; and nobody will deny that Greek and Latin adjectives in the neuter

gender are often used to express persons, but in this passage I think the addition of the pronoun *τέλος* alters the case, and obliges us to confine the sense so as to refer the adjectives to *οὐρανός*, the body, the present and future condition of which the Apostle treats of *particularly* throughout this chapter. No abstract term, as *χειρός*, or *συντηρήσις*, can be understood; the addition of *τέλος*, in my opinion, excludes this, as it expresses something definite and specific. But this is little to our present purpose; if it be proved that man is now *χειρός*, *ψυχής*, and *φλεγμός*, his materiality is undoubtedly proved. I will only add, that Paul, in his reasoning upon man at and after the resurrection, uses not one word which conveys any idea of immateriality, but just the contrary.

A N

**A P P E N D I X,**  
CONCERNING THE  
*INFLUENCE of a Belief of the SOUL's*  
**MATERIALITY,**  
Upon the FAITH and PRACTICE of CHRISTIANS.

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i. THAT Christ was raised from the dead in a peculiar manner, is one of the most important articles in a christian's creed; and very providentially, no fact recorded in the Bible, is authenticated by more full and satisfactory testimony. The next great fundamental doctrine of christianity is the resurrection of the dead in general, a doctrine frequently inculcated by Christ upon his disciples and hearers; not only upon those Jews who did not believe this article, but upon his followers and sincere believers, as a doctrine which would support and animate them in all their difficulties and persecutions in preaching his religion. That Christ was raised from the dead, and, in this respect, was the first-fruits of them who slept, was a doctrine so pregnant with consolation to his disciples and apostles, that we find they were not only

supported in their sufferings by this persuasion, but rejoiced and exulted in them. A true christian therefore, who believes that he is *material*, and that he will be *totally* dissolved into his original dust after death, is yet *fully* persuaded that death will have no *perpetual* victory over him, but that he will be restored to life and immortality hereafter. And that the thinking faculty in man dies, or ceases, with the death of his body, is a doctrine free from all difficulties and embarrassments to reason, and consonant to the universal tenor of revelation. The belief of the soul's materiality cannot therefore have any unfavourable influence either upon *the faith or practice of a sincere christian*, while he is fully persuaded that the scriptures are true, and that the dead will be raised according to these scriptures. He will not hesitate to believe this, because he cannot comprehend *the manner* of it; for he would have the same reason for disbelieving his present existence, which he is equally unable to comprehend. He may therefore safely rely upon Omnipotent Power to effect what it has promised; and when he has sincerely endeavoured to fulfil the duties of his christian profession, he may with humble,

yet well-founded confidence, expect to attain to the resurrection of the just.

2. When he is told that at this resurrection he will be changed, and that his vile body will be made like the glorious body of his Saviour, Christ, he may perhaps suppose that the change will make him a *different person*, and consequently incapable of enjoying any happiness, from a conscious reflection upon his good works performed in the flesh. That he will be changed from a gross and material body, into a spiritual and immortal body, is certainly true; but if this change alter not *his consciousness*, he will still remain the *same person*. For it is not the same organs, form, structure, or even matter which constitutes what is called personal identity, but the *same consciousness*. If therefore in a future state man retain the same *self-consciousness* (as he necessarily must, for otherwise he would neither be capable of reward nor punishment) he will be the *same person*, whatever other change his body may undergo. But the defenders of the soul's immateriality will object to this manner of accounting for personal identity, and say, that as the thinking or reflecting faculty in man is the property of an imma-

terial substance, a self-consciousness must necessarily survive the body, and be re-exercised in the same manner as it is now, as soon as the body is re-united to it. This objection has been answered before; we shall therefore add but one or two observations, deduced from that part of the Epistle to the Corinthians quoted above. *We shall be changed,* *καὶ μεταμορφωθείσης* Now, by the pronoun *we*, the writer must either mean the body only, which, if man consist of an immaterial part too, is both grammatically and physically wrong; or by *we* he must understand both soul and body, that is, according to the objector's sense, both the immaterial and material part of man, which is both contrary to the apostle's assertion in this passage, compared with the context, and to the immaterialist's hypothesis. This objection then both affords an additional argument for the materiality of the soul, and indirectly proves, that personal identity, at the resurrection, will result from a power of self-consciousness, communicated by the Author of all being to man's spiritual body. This self-consciousness, as was observed before, renders man capable of reward and punishment, as a voluntary and account-

able agent. But the christian may perhaps say, that if he be wholly material, he cannot conceive how he can have a power of self-agency *now*, and, more particularly, how he can be an accountable creature *bereafter*. If this be considered as an objection, it would be a sufficient solution of it to refer the objector to his own experience; but it does not specify or make a proper distinction, between mere matter, and matter organized, animated, and endowed with a faculty of thinking and self-motion.

3. Let not the sincere christian, who believes this account of the resurrection of the dead, suffer himself to be perplexed by idle and frivolous disputes about the resurrection of the *same* body; for Paul assures him that it will not be so, but that we shall be changed; for this material, corruptible, animal body, will be changed into a spiritual, incorruptible, immortal body; it is sown an animal body, it is raised a spiritual body. 1 Cor. xv. 44. He may safely believe the resurrection of *the body*, as it is expressed in the creed called The Apostles'; but Paul tells him this will be a *spiritual* body, and consequently not the same *mortal* body he has at present. From

what has been observed before respecting *personal identity*, he will easily perceive that the controversy about the resurrection of the body originated in a *verbal sophism*, and that the point to be discussed by the disputants was not the resurrection of the *same body*, but the *same person*. It must indeed be allowed, that, strictly speaking, the resurrection of the body must mean the resurrection of that body which dies and returns to dust; but yet, without supposing men actuated by scepticism, infidelity, or a fondness for controversy, one might reasonably suppose that Paul's very clear and satisfactory reasoning upon the resurrection, in the first epistle to the Corinthians, would have effectually prevented such a *logomachy* as this. If, in the creed mentioned above, instead of the resurrection <sup>\*</sup> of the body, the author had said, the resurrec-

\* I must indeed acknowledge that I have not found by whom, or by what authority, this article of the creed was introduced. It appears from Archbishop Usher's account, that the most ancient Roman copies of this creed expressed this article thus, *the resurrection of the flesh*, and not *the resurrection of the body*. When, or by whom, this alteration was made, as I observed before, is unknown to me; nor indeed do I think this knowledge, or the alteration in this article, of much consequence; but these expressions appear to me equally exceptionable, metaphysically considered. Rufin, in his Aquileian Creed, adds this to the word *flesh* in the article under consideration, which makes a additional embarrassment to the sense, which, by expressing it in this manner, he persuaded himself he had avoided.

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tion of or *from* the dead, it would certainly have been more conformable to scripture language, and better guarded against any cavils or quibbling objections. But as this creed, in its original form, was, perhaps, one of the most orthodox creeds that ever was introduced into the christian church, I have no doubt but the compiler of it intended to express Paul's doctrine in this article.

4. I hope the reader need not be informed, as it has been repeatedly expressed before, that what has been said of the resurrection of the dead, is to be understood of that resurrection which Paul treats of particularly in the fifteenth chapter of the first epistle to the Corinthians; i. e. the *first* resurrection, the resurrection of those who die in Christ, or, the resurrection of the just. But the same Apostle tells us, that there will be a resurrection both of the just and unjust. Acts xxiv. 15. And by a still higher authority we are assured, that all that are in the grave shall hear his (Christ's) voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, to the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, to the resurrection of condemnation. Job. v. 28, &c. But it ap-

pears from several passages in the New Testament, that the resurrection of the just and unjust will neither take place at the same time, nor be conducted in the same manner; but, upon the whole, it is sufficient for a christian to know, that there will certainly be a *resurrection of all men*, both the just and unjust; and that the first will be raised to life immortal, and the latter to condemnation and punishment.

5. It may, perhaps, be justly censured, as a rash and unwarrantable liberty, to venture any thing like a conjecture upon so solemn and important a subject as the destination of the unjust in a future life. After their judgment it is said that they shall go into everlasting punishment, *as ~~never~~*; but a punishment *absolutely everlasting* seems to be a punishment inconsistent with the attributes of a gracious and merciful God, who wishes that all his rational creatures should be saved. 1 Tim. ii. 4. Though the word *never*, I believe, conveys the idea of absolute eternity, except when it is applied to the Supreme Being; yet as it is used to express the punishment of the unrighteous, and the happiness of the just, with no apparent difference, (Matt. xxv. 46) then

is no way of evading the conclusion, that it has the same signification in both cases, except it can be proved that it is used in other parts of scripture both in a limited and unlimited sense. Such a proof, I presume, will not be difficult. When Moses gives the laws with regard to slaves; that slave, he says, who chooses not to quit his master's service, shall be carried by him to the door, and he shall bore his ear through with an awl, and the slave shall then serve him *for ever*, *as τοι είναι*. Exod. xxi. 6. And again, in Levit. xxv. 46, the property of slaves is vested in their masters *for ever*, *as τοι είναι*; and Duet. xv. 17, He shall be thy slave *for ever*, *as τοι είναι*; in all which passages, *ειναι* cannot signify a time longer than the duration of human life, a sense in which it often occurs in profane authors. But it would be tedious and unnecessary to quote all the passages of scripture in which *ειναι*, and its derivative *είναις*, are used in this limited sense: we may therefore, perhaps, justly conclude, that *είναι*, even when it occurs twice in the very same passage, may, like many other words in almost all languages, be understood in different, and almost contrary senses. It may be observed in general, that

there are passages in scripture where the happiness of the just is expressed in terms which imply a longer duration than any which are used to express the duration of the misery of the unjust. In Rev. xxii. 5, it is said, that the righteous servants of the Lord shall reign (in a state of happiness) for ever and ever, ~~as the sunneth the sunneth.~~ Our light affliction, which is but for a moment, worketh for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory, (2 Cor. iv. 17.) ~~and unipolar sic variolarum annis super doles nostri quoniam natus sumus.~~ The misery of the unjust is often said to be ~~eternitatis~~ eternal, but is never said, as far as I know, to be more than ~~eternitatis~~ as the happiness of the just is expressed here. Upon the whole, I hope we may safely conclude, that the happiness of the just in a future life will be *really eternal*, though *progressive* as to its ~~eternitatis~~ or greatness, as we suppose they, as well as the unjust, will, in that life, be *in a state of probation*; and that the word ~~eternitatis~~ when applied to the Supreme Being, signifies eternal, *a parte ante* and *a parte post*, as I think the Schoolmen express it. In the passage quoted above from Matthew, where the just and unjust are represented under the similitude of sheep and goats, the

latter, it is said, shall go away, ~~as *reprobatus* existit.~~  
but the former ~~in *bonis manis.*~~ Now the just, Paul  
says, will be raised ~~ad *probatur.*~~ and consequently  
immortal; but it is no where said that the un-  
just will be raised ~~ad *probatur.*~~ though their punish-  
ment is frequently represented as ~~manus.~~ What  
inference does this difference apparently au-  
thorise us to make? That the unjust will be  
raised from the dead with corruptible bodies,  
as they have now, and punished, according to  
their demerits, for a longer or shorter duration,  
but not eternally; that this state will be to  
them a state of probation; and that when they  
repent sincerely of the sins which they have  
committed in their prior state, they will all be  
finally saved. This is a doctrine which, if  
not directly revealed, may, I flatter myself,  
be fairly deduced from scripture, and the  
acknowledged attributes of our merciful and  
benign Creator. Some have thought that the  
unjust will not be raised from the dead; a  
doctrine, I conceive, not sufficiently autho-  
rised by scripture, and apparently incon-  
sistent with reason. The belief of annihila-  
tion is an encouragement to vice; and though  
some detached parts of Paul's epistles may  
seem to represent death as the consequence or

wages of sin, yet it is not consistent with the rules of sound criticism to interpret that *eternal death*, as the whole tenor of scripture represents this life as preparatory for another, and that a life of happiness or misery, according as our works in this are good or evil.

6. Though Matthew x. 28, and its parallel, Luke xii. 4, 5, may seem in our English version to countenance the doctrine of annihilation, after the resurrection at least, yet I am persuaded a due examination of these passages will not authorise such a conclusion. For, taking it for granted that Christ's apostles understood the term Gehenna in a metaphorical sense, as expressing the place of punishment appointed for the wicked in the life to come, yet the verb ~~απολλυμενος~~ cannot signify *absolute destruction*, or *annihilation*, as will evidently appear from its use in every other passage of scripture, I believe, where it is applied to a future life, and particularly from its derivative ~~απολλυμενος~~ in 2 Thess. i. 9, Those who know not God, and obey not the Gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ, shall be punished with *everlasting destruction*, ~~απολλυμενος~~. Now such a punishment as ~~απολλυμενος~~, destruction, or annihilation, literally signifies, is no punishment at all; but

when we find it in this passage with the limiting epithet ~~eternal~~, the duration of this punishment, though not eternal, is affirmed to be temporal at least, as has been proved before. It may be necessary to add, that though by ~~the dominion~~, in this passage of Matthew, is undoubtedly meant the Supreme Being, and that nobody will dispute the *power* of the Creator to destroy absolutely, or annihilate his rational creatures, yet we cannot with any propriety suppose this to be the sense intended, for the *very expression implies* that he will *not* exercise that power. I persuade myself that no particular remarks are necessary to be made upon the distinction of soul and body in this passage, as apparently proving that man consists of two parts, dissimilar in their nature; or, according to the vulgar belief, a part material and immaterial, as I hope the sense of νοῦς has been fully ascertained before, and shewn to signify nothing immaterial. Indeed those who believe that the soul is immaterial will want no arguments to persuade them that it is not perishable, or even destructible, except by omnipotent power. But we have not only digressed from our subject, but to matters which are not, and

probably were not proper to be revealed clearly to man. It is sufficient for a christian to be persuaded, that if he perform his duty properly in this life, he will be entitled in the next, through the mercy of his Creator, to the resurrection of the just; a resurrection which excited the apostle of the Gentiles to exclaim with triumphant joy, O death, where is thy sting! O grave, where is thy victory!

7. But though the just after this resurrection are said to be *τελευτικοί, spiritual, and αὐτοτελεῖς incorruptible*; yet neither of these words signifies that they will be absolutely immaterial or immortal of themselves. We have examined the senses in which *τελευτα* is used, and found no passage where it signified a purely immaterial being, except when it is applied to the only God. But *αὐτοτελεῖς* is applied to God as well as the just after the resurrection; and a mere English reader of the New Testament, who affixes the same ideas to the words *immortal* and *incorruptible*, would probably think the immortality of the just the same as the immortality of their Creator. But, as it was observed before, a very necessary distinction is to be made with respect to the *manner* in which God, and his creatures in a state of glory, are denominated *αὐτοτελεῖς, immortal.* God has im-

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mortality in himself, underived from another; man derives his from the free gift of God: God is likewise styled *invisible*, ~~material~~; man never: and consequently, though God will give the just at the resurrection immortal bodies, these bodies will not be *immaterial*, or *invisible*; and if *immortal man be material*, what reason can there be to suppose *mortal man to be immaterial*?

8. Perhaps it may be objected to what I have laid of the materiality of the soul in the second section, that many of my proofs are taken from the Old Testament, and that the writers of that had no expectation of any rewards or punishments, but such as were *temporal*. This may be granted *in general*; but yet it must likewise be granted, that all the Jews in our Saviour's time, except the Sadducees, expected and believed in a resurrection; and that Paul's use of the verb *περιέλθω*, in his second epistle to Timothy, must not be understood as if the Jews had been in *total darkness*, or totally unacquainted with the doctrine of a resurrection from the dead, (for their belief of it was general, excepting that sect just mentioned); but that this doctrine was *more clearly ascertained* by the preaching of

Christ, his raising the dead during his ministry, and particularly by his own resurrection. Hence many commentators upon this passage (2 Tim. i. 10.) have very pertinently observed, that ~~one~~ refers to the resurrection *as a fact*, and not *as a doctrine*. For when Christ endeavours to convince the Sadducees of the truth of a resurrection, his proof is deduced from those scriptures which they professed to believe, the writings of Moses. Now that the dead are raised, even Moses shewed at the bush, (Exod. iii. 6.) when he calleth the Lord, The God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. For he is not a God of the dead, but of the living; for all live unto him. Luke xx. 37. The historian adds, *all live unto him*; which signifies all live either *really* or *intentionally* to him. For one day with the Lord is as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day. 2 Pet. iii. 8. All events past, present, and to come, are, in comprehension of the Almighty, instantaneous; and indeed, though man sleep in the grave for thousands of years, *the moment in which his consciousness is restored is joined to that in which he was deprived of it*. Let it not be objected, that, if this be true, man's existence

ceases whenever he sleeps sound, without dreaming or thinking: for though it is just the same to him, during that period, as if he really had no existence, yet, as it is supposed that he still retains the vital faculty of respiration, it is not true that *his existence is suspended*, but only *his consciousness*.

9. When sacred authors figuratively express death by *sleep*, we may reasonably conclude that they believed death to be only a *temporary suspension* of animation; and that those who sleep in the grave would be waked again, or raised again to life. But when profane authors add to this figurative expression the epithets *απερινος*, *ηγυρος*, *χαλεπος*, and Latin writers adopt a similar language, we may as reasonably conclude that they had no idea of a resurrection, or the immortality of the soul. The learned reader, I am persuaded, will excuse my inserting upon this occasion Moschus's beautiful and pathetic description of the sleep of death:—

Αι αι, ται μαλαχαι μη εται κατα κεπον αλωνισμ  
Η τα χλυρα σελινα, τα τ`ινδαλις ολου αγηθον,  
Τοτερον αν ζωετι, και εις τος αλλο Φιεστι,  
Αιμης δοι μογαλοι και καρτροι η σοφοι αιδρες  
Οπηστι πρωτα θεωμες απακοι ετ ξδοις και λα  
Ευδομης ευμαλα μετρα, αετιρροτη, ηγυρετοι ιπνοι.

Many, indeed, of the more enlightened hea-

thens (whose creed, in this respect, seems to have been deduced from the oriental philosophical doctrines respecting the soul) had a confused notion, that something belonging to man, in this life, would survive or exist after his death, and be admitted into a state of happiness or misery; misery for a time at least, for some of them believed the modern papistical doctrine of a purgatory. And though a christian may perhaps accede to the purport of this doctrine, respecting the unjust, as conjecturally explained above, there is another article of a heathen's creed which he will probably not assent to immediately, I mean, his belief of a ~~ληθη~~, or *oblivion* in a future life, of many things at least in the present. I hope I shall not be considered as a patron of either heathenism or deism, if I should venture to suggest to him that I conjecture the heathen's creed in this particular may be right. For if the just are to be raised to a state of happiness, as he believes, and as the scriptures assure him they will, must he not conclude that when they find not amongst their number some with whom they were most intimately and affectionately connected in this life, it must greatly *detract* from their

happiness, or rather make them really unhappy? But in this state we are told that the sorrow of the righteous shall be turned into joy, that they will enter into the joy of their Lord: a state, as it appears, of *perfect joy* or happiness; a state inconsistent with such a recollection, or knowledge, as we have supposed. And if the righteous be exempt from such reflections in a future life of glory, we may surely conclude, supposing an intermediate state, that they will be exempt from them in that likewise. Not that I believe there is any such state of existence, for this would be to believe the human soul immortal of itself: but granting that there is, we must necessarily suppose that the souls of the just are incapable of remembering all unpleasing things in this life, otherwise they would be in a state of unhappiness, which cannot be supposed. I have never read the arguments which have been advanced by different authors, either *for* or *against the soul's sleeping from death to the resurrection*; but I need not inform the reader that I embrace the *affirmative side* of this question, nor need I give him any reasons for this opinion, which would only be to repeat what I have said before upon the soul's materiality. I shal

therefore conclude with this sincere declaration to those candid and ingenuous lovers of truth, who may favour this Attempt to prove the Materiality of the Soul with their perusal, that if I be convinced by them that my proof is fundamentally erroneous, I will immediately retract it, with grateful acknowledgements for the information. Should any reader of this description think that I have committed any error in the proof, a private communication of this will be deemed a favour; for though I am convinced of the truth of the general doctrine advanced in this publication, I am far from thinking that I may not have been mistaken in many particular arguments alledged in its support.

TEXT

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## ERRATA

for Deut. read Judges, in page 56, line 14.

for Duet. read Deut. in page 83, line 14.

for Mark xiv. 31, read Mark xiv. 38, in page 59, line



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ge 59, line

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